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ABSTRACT
Jain, Archana. PhD. The University of Memphis. August 2012. Worldwide Reach of
Short Selling Regulations. Major Professors: Thomas H. McInish, Ph.D. and Pankaj K.
Jain, Ph.D.

This dissertation characterizes the legality and incidence of short selling in a
worldwide, multimarket framework. Home country short selling restrictions curtail home
market stock borrowing by 45% and reduce short selling of the country’s ADRs by 68%
due to regulatory reach. Also, the 2008 U.S. ban on short selling of financial firms
reduced borrowing in foreign locations. These findings are robust to controls for option
availability, enforcement, returns, firm-size, trading volume, dividends, ADR level,
volatility, days-to-cover and industry sector. Further, investor conduct resulting from
adherence to professional standards is a more powerful mechanism of regulatory reach
than inter-government cooperation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Short selling has long been a controversial trading strategy. The academic
evidence on the value of short selling is mixed and market regulators’ actions suggest a
degree of ambivalence toward the practice.1 On the one hand, regulators often publicly
espouse the benefits of short selling in terms of its importance to the efficient processing
of information in asset markets.2 On the other hand, these same regulators typically react
to periods of market turmoil by banning short selling, arguing that the practice
exacerbates market volatility and, in the extreme, destabilizes markets. The most recent
financial crisis is no exception and many regulators resorted to either outright bans on
short selling, or imposed trading restrictions in an effort to stem the falling market and
reduce volatility. Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007), and Charoenrook and Daouk (2008),
and Beber and Pagano (2012) all provide evidence on the cross-country and time-series
variation in short selling regulations.

1

Most academic papers argue that short selling is an essential part of the price discovery
mechanism (Nilsson, 2008; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2009; Kolasinski, Reed, and Thornock,
2009) whereas others express concern about price manipulation (Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van
Ness, 2008). Nonetheless, Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) find that the practice is pervasive and
short selling volume is 24% of NYSE and 31% of NASDAQ trading volume. Edwards and
Hanley, (2010) find that short selling begins right from the day when a stock is sold in the initial
public offering.
2

For example, the Financial Services Authority (2002, p. 4), the NASDAQ
(http://www.nasdaq.com/quotes/short-interest.aspx), Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC) Chairman Greg Medcraft
(www.theaustralian.com.au/business/markets/securities-regulator-will-not-ban-short-selling-saysgreg-medcraft/story-e6frg916-1226113803879) and SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey
(http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch022410klc-shortsales.htm) have all stated that short
selling is a legitimate investment activity, which plays an important role in supporting efficient
markets.
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The complexity of this issue is further exacerbated by the fact that, while the
motivation for the bans is often clear, it is entirely unclear whether or not the bans were
in any way successful in achieving these goals. The limited empirical research suggests
that the bans did not reduce volatility (Bris, 2008; Boulton and Braga-Alves, 2010; Saffi
and Sigurdsson, 2011) and may even have increased volatility (Boehmer, Jones, and
Zhang, 2009; Charoenrook and Daouk, 2009). Indeed, it is interesting to note that the
outgoing SEC chairman, Christopher Cox, admitted that the 2008 short selling bans were
the “biggest mistake” of his term (Paley and Hilzenrath, 2008).3 Other regulators do not
appear to share this view, however, and short selling bans were again imposed in many
countries in 2011.
The purpose of our study is to provide further evidence on the effectiveness of
short selling restrictions. However, unlike previous research, our paper is the first to
investigate how home market restrictions affect short selling in a global multimarket
setting. Specifically, we examine the extent to which national regulators are able to
effectively enforce short selling restrictions both within and outside their home markets.
Our focus is on firms that are cross- listed in the form of an ADR, as they provide an
ideal setting for testing our research questions.
In our paper, two competing hypotheses are considered to explain the impact of
short selling restrictions on foreign markets–regulatory arbitrage versus regulatory
reach. The regulatory arbitrage hypothesis suggests that when the home market

3

Further, SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey also has publicly expressed her view that
the bans created “significant disruption and distortions” in the market (Williams, 2009).

2

introduces restrictions, short selling moves to foreign locations.4 In the current context,
this suggests that regulatory arbitrage increases ADR short volume if traders opt to trade
in unrestricted regimes, although the existence of taxes or fees on foreign transactions,
capital controls, inconvertibility of currencies, and market segmentation does complicate
the relationship (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999). Empirical support for this hypothesis can
be found in Blau, Van Ness, and Warr (2012), who construct a feasibility index of short
selling based on subjective assessment of survey responses and find evidence of
increased shorting in the United States of ADRs from countries that prohibit short selling
in the domestic market. An important point of distinction between Blau, Van Ness, and
Warr (2012) and our paper is that we have invested substantial effort in ensuring that our
legality of short selling variable accurately reflects the status of short selling in each
country over time.5 Moreover, our data sample is more comprehensive and covers 1,035
ADRs from November 2007 to December 2010 compared to only 352 ADRs sampled
over 2005 and 2006 in Blau, Van Ness, and Warr (2012).
The regulatory reach hypothesis suggests that home country restrictions curtail
short selling of cross-listed stocks in foreign markets. In the current context, this

4

Rodrigo Buenaventura from the CNMV commented that one of the reasons short selling
was banned in Spain during the crisis was to avoid attracting the pent-up short selling demand
that could not be expressed in other Euro markets, which had bans in place (“Short Sales
Restrictions–What Are They Good For?”, panel discussion at the IX Madrid Finance Workshop
(Short Selling), IESE, Madrid, Nov. 4, 2010.)
5

Our effort corrects some erroneous classifications adopted in the prior research. For
example, we are claiming that short selling in Spanish ADRs is high because it is legal to short
sell in Spain (regulatory reach). Blau, Van Ness, and Warr (2012) conclude that short selling in
Spanish ADRs is high because it is not feasible to short sell in Spain (regulatory arbitrage). The
position taken in prior research is incorrect because our stock borrowing data show that it is
actually very feasible to short sell in Spain. This observation is true for several countries where
we observe short selling related borrowing (which has a correlation of 0.9 with short interest
according to Data Explorers) occurring even though short selling is classified as infeasible.
3

suggests that foreign country trading restrictions decrease short selling of a stock’s ADR
in the U.S. market. Regulatory reach can decrease short selling of a country’s ADRs in
the United States through a variety of mechanisms that we group into two major themes–
inter-government cooperation and investor conduct. Regulatory reach may reflect a
country’s bilateral investment treaties or membership in groups such as G7, OECD or the
EU, which facilitate inter-government cooperation through clearer communication of the
regulatory intent to foreign market participants (Lau and McInish, 2002), the court’s
recognition and enforcement of foreign laws (Keller, 2004), and cooperation among
global law enforcement agencies (Block, 2007; Hamilton, 2008). For example, in 2008
the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued Short Selling (No. 3) Instrument
2008/51, which according to Avgouleas (2010, p.17), “had a global reach covering
shorting of shares in the list anywhere, e.g., on Frankfurt (Deutsche Borse) or the New
York Stock Exchange.” Similarly, in its statement concerning short selling, the SEC
(2008-235) stated that its actions were taken in consultation with regulators of the major
developed securities markets around the world with which it coordinated in monitoring
market reactions. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has
put in place a structure for its member agencies to cooperate and exchange information in
the process of developing, implementing and promoting adherence to internationally
recognized and consistent standards of regulation, oversight, and enforcement.
Alternatively, regulatory reach may be driven by investor conduct and worldwide
compliance. For example, financial firms may avoid circumventing regulations in their
home markets to avoid scrutiny by the regulator and possibly violating the terms of their
trading license (Ellickson, 1991). Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998), Coffee (1999,
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2002), and Erickson, Goolsbee, and Maydew (2003) observe that the overwhelming
majority of firms take a conservative stance and do not engage in regulatory arbitrage at
all. Further, many individuals employed within the finance industry are governed by the
CFA Institute's Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct, which states that
members must understand and comply with all applicable laws, rules, and regulations of
any government, regulatory organization, licensing agency, or professional association
governing their professional activities. In the event of conflict, members must comply
with the more strict law, rule, or regulation. Similarly, the Institute’s standard relating to
integrity of capital markets and market manipulation, may discourage members from
undertaking stock lending and other closely related activities when short selling is
unlawful.
In our paper, we have assembled a unique panel database from a variety of
sources, which allows us to establish the relative effectiveness of short selling
restrictions, including the relative merits of the regulatory reach versus regulatory
arbitrage hypotheses. The distinction between these two hypotheses is important because
in a race to the bottom (Schram, 2000), regulatory arbitrage implies that stricter rules
(whether excessive or fair) decrease a country's business competitiveness relative to other
countries with lax rules. Therefore, regulatory reach is essential to obtain the desired
investor protection outcomes with reasonable costs in a competitive global economy.
The main results of our paper may be summarized as follows. We begin by
considering the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement of short selling restrictions in the
home markets. While intuitively obvious, empirical work on this issue is lacking, and, as
expected, we find that short selling related stock borrowing is significantly lower in

5

countries that impose restrictions. To understand the dynamics of a multi-market trading
environment, we combine several unique short selling datasets containing stock
borrowing, short interest, and short trading volume. Univariate comparisons, matched
control sample experiments, multivariate regressions, all consistently provide evidence in
support of the regulatory reach hypothesis. That is to say, restrictions curtail short selling
not only in the home market, but also in the U.S. market where the ADRs are cross-listed.
These findings remain strongly significant after controlling for option market availability,
past returns, return volatility, firm specific characteristics such as size and dividend
policy, ADR level, stock borrowing costs, industrial sectors, and trading volume.
Furthermore, we find that regulatory reach also works for U.S. firms in the reverse
direction. Specifically, in September 2008 when the United States banned short selling of
financial firms, stock borrowing for those firms declined in the foreign locations outside
the United States as well. Finally, we test the mechanisms of regulatory reach and find
that investor conduct is a stronger mechanism of regulatory reach than inter-government
cooperation.

6

Chapter 2
Data sources and sample formation
Firms with cross-listed ADRs provide an ideal setting for testing our research
questions. As such, a list of 2,892 eligible firms and their International Securities
Identification Number (ISIN) was sourced in November 2009 from the Bank of New
York Mellon and J.P. Morgan web sites.1 Each firm’s home country is identified using
the first two digits of the ISIN, which represents the originating country’s ISO codes. We
sourced from Datastream information on firm-specific returns, market capitalization,
volume, dividend yield, closing price, intraday high price, intraday low price, and sector
classification information.
For each of these ADR-issuing firms, data on short selling is assembled from a
variety of sources. We obtain daily information on the stock lending industry from Data
Explorers for the period July 2006 to January 2010.2 Data Explorers report that the
correlation between publicly reported levels of short interest and the level of stock
lending is approximately 0.90, which suggests that stock lending data provide a
reasonable proxy for short selling. In addition to individual stock loan information, Data
Explorers also provides information on the amount of stock available for loan and the
stock borrowing cost. It is important to note that the database allows the identification of

1

The cumulative sponsor bank list from J.P. Morgan and Bank of New York Mellon
contains 3,013 ADRs. We removed the firms, which are listed or exchanged outside the United
States, and firms that do not have information on ISIN.
2

Data Explorers data are available on Bloomberg. Data Explorers is based in London and
according to its website its institutional clients account for 70% of the worldwide stock borrowing
related to short selling. Data Explorers covers thousands of equities worldwide and receives
information on more than 3 million transactions daily from more than 100 top securities lending
firms for commercial dissemination.
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the country where the borrowing takes place, so that it is possible to tell whether the
shares are being borrowed in the home country or elsewhere. A more detailed
description of the Data Explorers dataset may be found in Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011).3
After merging the initial sample with Data Explorers stock borrowing data and
Datastream firm characteristics data, our final daily data sample has 1,601 ADRs to
assess regulatory effectiveness.
In addition to the daily Data Explorers stock borrowing information, we also
source fortnightly short interest data from Shortsqueeze.com for more than 16,000 stocks
that trade on NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX, OTC/BB, and Pink Sheets. Short interest is
defined as the total number of outstanding shorted shares for each security. In addition to
the number of shares sold short, supporting data such as days to cover and institutional
ownership also are available. Triangulation of the initial ADR list, the shortsqueeze.com
open interest data and Datastream, yields a fortnightly data sample of 1,035 ADRs.
Our final sources of short selling data are FINRA (Regulation-SHO data) and the
BATS exchange. These transaction level short sale data are aggregated to obtain daily
short volume for each stock from the first availability date of August 2009 to January
2010 (the latest period for which we have Data Explorers data). Triangulation of the
initial ADR list, the aggregated daily FINRA and BATS data and Datastream yields a
trading data sample of 559 ADRs.
3

We clean the Data Explorers data in several ways. We eliminate exact duplicates. Data
Explorers provides values in one of four currencies—USD, EUR, JPY, AUD—depending on
where the data are collected. We convert all monetary values into USD based on daily exchange
rates obtained from Datastream. Data Explorers includes the variable dividend requirement that
allows us to make sure that our results are not affected by dividend capture trades. We keep the
observations with dividend requirement = 100, because these are the standard loan agreements.
Dividend requirement other than 100% indicates dividend capture and tax arbitrage motivated
trades.
8

Chapter 3
Short selling regulations around the world
Information on the legality of short selling across a wide range of countries is
obtained by cross-referencing the survey articles of Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007),
Charoenrook and Daouk (2008), and Beber and Pagano (2012) with the practitioner’s
report of Clifford Chance LLP (2009). Where clarification or further information is
necessary, we directly correspond with the stock exchanges and financial market
regulators. Table 1 presents a summary of information on the legality status of short
selling in each country with specific details of the periods when short selling was legal or
illegal. In addition to considering a simple binomial measure of short selling legality, we
attempt to gain additional insights into the impact of short selling restrictions by
distinguishing between the different short selling rules that exist. The details of any
intermediate forms of restrictions also are presented in columns 2 to 4. Apart from
outright bans, other forms of restrictions include specific trading mechanisms (up-tick
rule), pre-borrowing requirements (ban on naked short selling), and bans on shorting
selected stocks (typically financial stocks).
Similar to previous studies, we create an indicator variable, illegal, which equals
1 if short selling is prohibited in the home market and 0 otherwise. Unlike the past
research however, which typically specifies an unconditional measure of short selling
restrictions, we allow this variable to vary over time for countries that changed their short
selling rules during the sample period. For example, 19 countries imposed temporary
restrictions on short selling during the 2008 financial crisis, while China lifted its
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restriction on short selling for 11 brokerage firms in 2008. The intermediate forms of
restrictions create interesting cross-sectional variations for our analysis.
Table 1 also presents basic metrics on the relative presence of short selling in each
country. The average short interest ratio for all ADRs from each country, which is
defined as short interest as a percentage of shares float, is reported in column 5. The
aggregate dollar amount of short-selling related borrowing of all stocks from each
country is reported in column 6. Finally, column 7 presents the aggregate scaled
borrowing ratio (SBR) for each country, which is calculated as the daily average
outstanding dollar borrowing divided by the country’s total stock market capitalization at
the end of previous year. These last two statistics are derived using Data Explorers data,
where the daily data is averaged across all days in the sample period.
Preliminary insights into the impact of regulations on short selling may be
obtained by considering a plot of short selling in home markets as well as in the ADR
markets. Sample firms are divided in two groups of unrestricted versus restricted based
on home-country short-selling regulatory regimes. The restricted category includes uptick
restriction, naked ban, or a total ban on short selling. In Figure 1a, we plot the average
home market stock borrowing in millions of USD for the countries in the two groups. In
Figure 1b, stock borrowing is scaled by the firm’s market capitalization. Both panels
indicate that short selling restrictions are effective in curtailing home market stock
borrowing because the stock borrowing for unrestricted countries is higher than the stock
borrowing for restricted countries.
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Table 1
Global shifts in short selling regulations and activity
We provide a timeline of the legality of short selling around the world, including the dates of bans implemented during the
financial crisis of 2008. We also provide details both of borrowing in the home country and short selling of ADRs in the
United States. We report the periods when short selling was legal (column 2) or illegal (column 3) in a particular country. For
these two columns, we classify the period as illegal based on a total ban. None, always, and since inception in these two
columns refer to periods within our sample period. In column 4, we report other short-selling restrictions when short selling is
not completely banned. In column 5, we report the ADR short interest ratio which is defined as the short interest as a
percentage of share float. In column 6, we report the daily average outstanding dollar value of shares borrowed summed across
all stocks from that country. In column 7, we present the scaled borrowing ratio (SBR), which is the daily average outstanding
dollar borrowing during our sample period (July 2006 to January 2010) divided by the country’s total stock market
capitalization at the end of the previous year.
Country
Period when
Period when
Nature of restriction and other
ADR
Borrowing
SBR
legal
illegal
comments
short
($ million)
interest
ratio
Argentina
Since 1999
Before 1999
Up-tick rule applies; Naked
0.86
0
0.00
short selling prohibited
Australia
Pre 09/22/2008; 09/22/2008 Naked short selling prohibited
0.35
30,258
3.04
11/20/2008 11/19/2008
since 2001
Present
Ban on shorting financial
stock: 9/22/2008 - 05/25/2009
Austria
Since inception
None
Ban on naked short selling of
0.00
3,777
2.43
financial stocks: 10/27/2008 11/30/2010
Bahrain
None
Always
0.00
0
0.00
b
Bangladesh
None
Always
0.00
0
0.00
Barbados
None
Always
No ADRs
0
0.00
Belgium
Since inception
None
Ban on naked short selling of
0.52
6,720
2.17
financial stocks: 9/22/2008 9/21/2009
Bermuda
None
Always
0.00
8,985
NA
Brazil
Since inception
None
Naked short selling prohibited
10.03
22
0.00
11

Table 1–continued
Country
Period when
legal

Period when
illegal

Bulgaria
Canada c

None
Since inception

Always
None; see
comments

Cayman
Islands
Chile

Since inception

None

Since 1999

Before 1999

China

None

Always; see
comments

Colombia
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech
Republic
Denmark

None
None
None
Since inception

Always
Always
Always
None

Since inception

Ecuador b
Egypt a
Finland
France

None
None
Since 1998
Since inception

None; see
comments
Always
Always
Before 1998
None; see
comments

Georgia b

None

Nature of restriction and other
comments

Ban on shorting financial
stocks (including inter-listed
in U.S.): 9/19/2008 10/08/2008; Up-tick rule
applies
Very little trading occurs on
the stock exchange
Up-tick rule applies; Naked
short selling prohibited
In 9/2008, China allowed
short selling of 11 brokerage
firms on a pilot basis

Ban on shorting bank stocks:
10/13/2008–Present

Ban on naked short selling of
credit institutions and
insurance companies' stocks:
9/22/2008 - Present

Always
12

ADR
short
interest
ratio
0.00
No ADRs

Borrowing
($ million)

SBR

0
58,183

0.00
3.63

6.71

4,395

NA

0.36

0

0.00

0.87

9,440

0.28

0.74
0.00
0.00
0.00

0
0
173
104

0.00
0.00
1.09
0.19

0.13

3,650

1.76

0.00
0.00
0.55
2.63

0
0
6,423
102,719

0.00
0.00
2.55
4.77

0.00

0

0.00

Table 1–continued
Country
Period when
legal

Period when
illegal

Nature of restriction and
other comments

Investment funds except
hedge funds may not short
sell; Ban on naked short
selling of specified financial
stocks: 9/19/2008–Present
Up-tick rule applies; Naked
short selling prohibited

Germany

Since inception

None; see
comments

Greece

10/10/2008 05/31/2009

Hong Kong a

Pre 10/10/2008;
06/01/2009 Present
Since 1994

Hungary
Iceland

Since 1996
Since inception

Before 1996
None; see
comments

India

Since
12/20/2007

Before
12/20/2007
(Badla trading
existed)

Indonesia

Pre Oct 2008;
May 2009–
Present

Oct. 2008 - April
2009

Before 1994

Permitted for specified
securities (33 in 1994-95);
Up-tick rule applies; Naked
short selling prohibited
Ban on naked short selling of
financial stocks: 11/06/2008
- 1/31/2009
Badla trading means carry
over transaction with
extended rolling settlements;
Naked short selling is
prohibited; On 10/20/2008,
SEBI disapproved stock
lending by FIIs of
participatory notes (PNs)
stocks
Legal only for specified
stocks

13

ADR
short
interest
ratio
0.53

Borrowing
($ million)

SBR

81,259

5.24

0.08

177

0.10

6.29

7,561

0.00

0.05
No ADRs

905
47

2.57
0.18

1.26

1

0.00

0.24

29

0.02

Table 1–continued
Country
Period when
legal

Period when
illegal

Nature of restriction and
other comments

Ban on naked short selling of
financial stocks: 9/19/2008–
Present
Naked short selling
prohibited
Naked short selling ban for
financial stocks: 9/22/2008 5/31/2009; Naked short
selling ban for non-financial
stocks: 10/10/2008 1/01/2009

Ireland

Since inception

None; see
comments

Israel

Since inception

None

Italy

Since inception

None

Jamaica
Japan

None
Since inception

Always
None

Jordan
Kazakhstan b
Kuwait
Latvia
Lebanon b
Lithuania
Luxembourg

None
None
None
None
None
None
Since inception

Always
Always
Always
Always
Always
Always
None

Up-tick rule and locate
requirement apply; Ban on
naked short selling:
10/30/2008–Present

Ban on naked short selling of
banks and insurance
companies: 9/19/2008–
Present
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ADR
short
interest
ratio
0.97

Borrowing
($ million)

SBR

2,349

2.03

1.09

293

0.17

1.66

29,328

3.45

0.00
0.30

0
47,580

0.00
1.13

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
3.19

0
0
0
0
0
0
5,100

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
5.29

Table 1–continued
Country
Period when
legal

Period when
illegal

Nature of restriction and
other comments

Naked short selling
prohibited; Uptick rule
applies; Legal only for
specified stocks

Malaysia

Pre-1997; Jan.
2007–Present

Sep. 1997 to
Dec. 2006

Malta b
Mauritius
Mexico

None
None
Since inception

Always
Always
None

Morocco
Netherlands

None
Since inception

Always
None

New Zealand

Since 1992

Before 1992

Nigeria
Norway

None
Since 1992

Always
None; see
comments

Oman b

None

Always

Naked short selling
prohibited; Up-tick rule
applies
Naked short selling ban:
9/22/2008 - 6/01/2009
Since April 1992, specified
securities eligible for short
selling; After July 2000, all
liquid securities eligible.
Short selling is hindered by
tax legislation.
Ban on naked short selling
of 5 specified financial
stocks: 10/08/2008 - Present

15

ADR
short
interest
ratio
0.00

Borrowing
($ million)

SBR

5

0.00

0.00
0.00
1.33

0
23
1,043

0.00
0.57
0.33

0.00
0.92

35
18,453

0.06
2.69

0.09

760

1.91

0.00
0.32

0
5,803

0.00
2.38

0.00

0

0.00

Table 1–continued
Country
Period when
legal

Period when
illegal

Nature of restriction and
other comments

Pakistan

Since inception

None

“Regulations for Short
Selling under Ready
Market” introduced in 2002:
Naked short selling is
prohibited; Up-tick rule
applies; Short selling
allowed only in prescribed
securities

Panama
Peru
Philippines

None
None
Since 1998

Always
Always
Before 1998

Poland

Since 2000

Before 2000

Portugal

Since inception

None

Qatar b
Russia a

Since inception
Pre 9/18/2008;
and
6/16/2009 Present
None

None
9/18/2008 6/15/2009

Serbia

Naked short selling
prohibited; Up-tick rule
applies; Legal only for
specified stocks
Shorting allowed only in the
permitted securities
Ban on naked short selling
of specified financial stocks:
9/24/2008 - Present
Up-tick rule applies

Always
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ADR
short
interest
ratio
0.00

Borrowing
($ million)

SBR

0

0.00

0.00
0.96
0.31

959
0
6

15.84
0.00
0.01

0.00

41

0.03

0.03

1,384

1.43

0.00
1.47

0
73

0.00
0.00

No ADRs

0

0.00

Table 1–continued
Country
Period when
legal

Period when
illegal

Nature of restriction and
other comments

Singapore

Since inception

None

Slovakia a
Slovenia
South Africa

Ban on naked short sales in
buy-in market. Onshore
lending is limited while
offshore lending is active

None
Since inception
Since inception

Always
None
None

South Korea a

Sep 1996 to
9/30/2008; and
6/01/2009Present

Before 1996;
10/01/2008 5/31/2009

Spain

Since 1992

Before 1992

Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland

None
Since 1991
Since inception

Always
Before 1991
None; see
comments

Naked short selling
prohibited
Ban on shorting financial
stocks: 10/1/2008–Present;
Naked short selling ban from
June 2000 to Present; Uptick rule applies
Naked short selling
prohibited

9/19/2008 - 1/16/2009:
Swiss Federal Banking
Commission and SIX Swiss
Exchange prohibited naked
short selling; SWX-Europe
also prohibited creation or
increase of a net short
position in certain specified
UK and Swiss financial
stocks
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ADR
short
interest
ratio
0.07

Borrowing
($ million)

SBR

3,359

1.22

No ADRs
No ADRs
1.02

0
0
2,259

0.00
0.00
0.34

0.76

3,633

0.00

0.09

30,330

2.34

0.00
1.39
0.92

0
11,065
30,949

0.00
2.37
2.84

Table 1–continued
Country
Period when
legal

Taiwan

Period when
illegal

Nature of restriction and
other comments

10/01/2008 11/28/2008

Up-tick rule applies

Thailand

Pre 10/01/2008;
11/28/2008 Present
Since Jan 2001

Before Jan 2001

Tunisia b
Turkey

Only specified securities are
eligible (underlying
securities of SET 50 index,
ETF, and underlying
securities of ETF); Up-tick
rule applies; Naked short
selling prohibited

None
Since inception

Always
None

Ukraine
UAE
United
Kingdom

None
None
Since inception

Always
Always
None; see
comments

United States c Since inception

None; see
comments

Up-tick rule applies; Only
specified stocks eligible

Ban on short selling of
specified financial stocks:
9/19/2008 - 1/16/2009
Up-tick rule effective:
2/01/1938 - 7/03/2007; Ban
on naked short selling of 19
financial stocks: 7/21/2008 8/12/2008; Ban on short
selling of specified financial
stocks: 9/19/2008 10/08/2008; Quote based
restrictions imposed in 2010.
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ADR
short
interest
ratio
0.76

Borrowing
($ million)

SBR

301

0.00

0.00

390

0.27

0.00
0.38

0
481

0.00
0.26

0.00
0.00
0.55

0
9
73,044

0.00
0.01
2.33

No ADRs

510,764

3.01

Table 1–continued
Country
Period when
legal

Period when
illegal

Nature of restriction and
other comments

ADR
SBR
Borrowing
short
($ million)
interest
ratio
Venezuela
None
Always
0.00
3
0.00
Zambia
None
Always
No ADRs
0
0.00
Zimbabwe
None
Always
0.00
0
0.00
a
This country has some borrowing in the Data Explorers data, but we do not have market capitalization for this country.
b
This country is not included in Data Explorers.
c
The United States does not have any ADRs for domestic companies. Canadian stocks also are fully fungible and do not trade
as ADRs. Hence, the United States and Canada are excluded from the remainder of our analysis.

Next, we use the short interest and short volume data to provide a macro level assessment of the regulatory reach
versus regulatory arbitrage hypothesis. In Figure 2a, we plot the short interest of ADRs originating from the countries where
short selling is legal and from the countries where short selling is illegal. The short interest of ADRs from the countries where
short selling is legal is generally higher (41 out of 48 fortnights), than the short interest of ADRs from the countries where it is
illegal.
Figure 2b presents a similar plot for short volume and shows that short volume of ADRs from the countries where short
selling is legal is always higher than the short volume of ADRs from the countries where it is illegal. Thus, these results
provide initial evidence in support of the regulatory reach hypothesis.
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a

b

Fig. 1.
Short selling in the home country, by short selling regime
In Figure 1a, We plot short selling related borrowing (amount outstanding at the end of
each day, in millions of USD) for the countries where short selling is restricted (solid
line) and for the countries where short selling is unrestricted (broken line). Short
borrowing data are from Data Explorers for July 2006 to January 2010. Each observation
in the original dataset represents dollar stock borrowing for a given stock on a given day.
Based on the originating country’s short selling restriction on the relevant calendar day,
each stock-day is allocated to either the restricted or the unrestricted portfolio. Then, for
each country we compute the average stock borrowing across all stocks from that country
and then the average across countries. In Figure 1b, we scale the dollar borrowing by the
stock’s market capitalization.
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a
Short Interest of ADRs in the U.S. (million $)
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Legal

Illegal

b
Short Volume of ADRs in the U.S. ($ million)
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
8/3/2009

9/3/2009

10/3/2009

11/3/2009
Legal

12/3/2009

1/3/2010

Illegal

Fig. 2.
Impact of home country regulations on monthly short selling of ADRs in the United
States
In Figure 2a, we plot the short interest of ADRs from countries where short selling is
illegal (solid line) and from countries where short selling is legal (broken line). Short
interest data are from shortsqueezee.com for November 2007 to October 2009. In Figure
2b, we plot the short volume of ADRs from the countries where short selling is illegal
(solid line) and legal (broken line). Short volume data are from the FINRA and BATS
exchanges for August 2009 to January 2010. Short interest data are at fortnightly
frequency and short volume is at daily frequency. We follow a two-step averaging
process analogous to that described in Figure 1.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Results
We begin with a brief description of our general framework for the regression
models and then present specific regression equations assessing home market
effectiveness of short selling restrictions and pair-wise tests of worldwide regulatory
reach. The Appendix shows our data source and variable definition for each of our
variables.

4.1. Regulatory restrictions and other determinants of short selling
Our main dependent variable is short selling, which we measure with three
alternative variables–stock borrowing in the home market, short interest of ADRs in the
United States, and short volume of ADRs in the United States. Our key explanatory
variable relates to the regulatory environment and captures information on whether short
selling is legal or illegal and restricted or unrestricted.
The prior research suggests the need to include several control variables, although
the nature of their relationship with short selling is often unclear and few papers offer any
direct test of how those variables affect short selling in a multi-market context. The
presence of options trading is one such variable. Figlewski and Webb (1993) find a
significantly higher average level of short interest for optionable stocks and argue that
options facilitate short selling, which suggests a complementary effect. Similarly,
Battalio and Schultz (2011) document complementarities between short selling and
options. On the other hand, Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) propose that options reduce
short selling due to a substitution effect. Stock return is another possible control variable
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and Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) as well as Jain, Jain, and McInish (2012) find that
positive stock returns increase short selling. Blau, Van Ness, Van Ness, and Wood (2010)
however, find that extremely negative market returns increase short selling. Diether, Lee,
and Werner (2009) also show that return volatility affects short selling. Jones and Lamont
(2002) find that stocks that are expensive to short or that enter the borrowing market have
high valuations and low subsequent returns, consistent with the overpricing hypothesis.
D’Avolio (2002) documents significant variations in borrowing costs across stocks, with
a few stocks that become extremely special, demanding negative rebate rates (i.e., loan
fees in excess of the risk-free rate). Krispy Kreme Doughnuts and Palm Inc. are examples
of such stocks, exhibiting loan fees as high as 50% and 35%, respectively. To summarize,
the evidence presented in these studies suggest that our model needs to include control
variables for the existence of an option market in the home country, past returns, return
volatility, and stock borrowing costs. We also include a number of other control variables
that may relate to the level of short selling such as dividend yield, firm size (Diether, Lee
and Werner, 2009), the level of the ADRs, and days to cover.
Note that D’Avolio (2002) and Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) argue that
higher institutional ownership positively affects short selling by increasing the supply of
loanable shares. Due to the limited availability of such data however, we use institutional
ownership data only in a robustness test and we expect a positive relationship between
institutional ownership and the amount of short selling.
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4.2. Regulatory effectiveness of short selling restriction in curtailing home market stock
borrowing
We assess the home market effectiveness of short selling restrictions using daily
Data Explorers data for short selling related borrowing. If the regulations are effectively
enforced, countries with restrictions will have a lower amount of borrowing. Thus, we
expect a statistically significant negative coefficient for the illegal variable in the
regression with stock borrowing as a dependent variable. We estimate all or a subset of
the following equation and report the results in Table 2:

scaled shares borrowed in home countryi,d = α0 + α1 illegalc,d
+ α2 uptick restrictionc,d + α3 option marketsc,yr + α4 returni,d + α5 weekly returni,d-1
+ α6 monthly returni,d-1 + α7 half-yearly returni,d-1 + α8 scaled volumei,d
+ α9 dividend yieldi,d + α10 return volatilityi,d + α11borrowing costi,d
+ α12-15 industrial sector fixed effectsi + εi,d

(1)

where α0–α15 are parameters to be estimated and ε is a random error term. Subscripts i, d,
c, and yr denote firm, day, country, and year, respectively. The subscript d -1 indicates
that the return period ends on the day before day d. The dependent variable is scaled
shares borrowed, which is the home market borrowing of each individual firm on day t,
scaled by its market capitalization.
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Table 2
Regulatory effectiveness of home country short selling restrictions in curtailing home
market stock borrowing
For this table, our sample comprises the underlying stocks for 1,601 ADRs for the
period from July 2006 to January 2010. All our variables are defined in the Appendix.
For each stock i for each day d, we collect the home market dollar stock borrowing,
which we divide by stock i‘s market capitalization to produce our dependent variable, the
firm’s scaled shares borrowed in the home country. Our main independent variables are
the dummy variables illegal and uptick restriction. The remaining independent variables
are: option markets, return, weekly return, monthly return, half yearly return, scaled
volume, dividend yield, return volatility, borrowing cost, and sector fixed effects.
Subscripts i, d, c, and yr denote firm, day, country, and year, respectively. All coefficients
are standardized using the SAS proc reg stb option. Continuous variables are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Statistical significance is based on double clustered
standard errors along the firm and fortnightly time dimensions following Petersen (2009).
Dependent variable:
Scaled shares borrowed in home countryi,d
Variable
Model 1a
Model 1b
Model 1c
Intercept
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Illegalc,d
-0.0063***
-0.0017*
(-4.95)
(-1.69)
Uptick restrictionc,d
-0.0471***
-0.0469***
(-5.22)
(-5.20)
Option marketsc,yr
0.0321***
0.0156***
0.0156***
(7.15)
(3.27)
(3.29)
-0.0067
-0.0069
-0.0069
Returni,d
(-1.38)
(-1.42)
(-1.42)
Weekly returni,d-1
-0.0013
-0.0011
-0.0011
(-0.94)
(-0.90)
(-0.89)
-0.0089
-0.0088
-0.0088
Monthly returni,d-1
(-1.23)
(-1.21)
(-1.22)
Half yearly returni,d-1
0.0110*
0.0069
0.0067
(1.78)
(1.20)
(1.16)
Scaled volumei,d
0.4589
0.4578
0.4578
(1.32)
(1.31)
(1.31)
Dividend Yieldi,d
-0.0031
-0.0132**
-0.0130**
(-0.58)
(-2.32)
(-2.30)
Return volatilityi,d
-0.0031***
-0.0019**
-0.0019**
(-3.39)
(-2.46)
(-2.48)
Borrowing costi,d
0.0168
0.0138
0.0139
(1.38)
(1.19)
(1.20)
Days to coveri,d-1
0.0114***
0.0095***
0.0095***
(4.41)
(4.35)
(4.35)
Sector fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Adjusted R Square
0.2128
0.2146
0.2146
Number of Observations
928,330
928,330
928,330
***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.10 level
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Hereafter, we present standardized coefficient estimates to allow comparison of
the relative impact and importance of each determinant of short selling.1 Furthermore, we
report statistical significance based on double clustered standard errors along firm and
fortnightly time dimensions following Petersen (2009).
We find that the coefficient of illegal is negative and significant in both models 1a
and 1c presented in Table 2. Similarly, the coefficient of the uptick restriction also is
negative and significant in models 1b and 1c, indicating that short selling restrictions are
associated with a lower level of stock borrowing in the home country. These results point
to the regulatory effectiveness of short selling restrictions in curtailing borrowing activity
in the home country.
Among the control variables, the coefficient on option markets is positive and
significant in all models, indicating that derivative trades have the complementary effect
of increasing stock borrowing in the home market. The coefficients of the return variables
are not significant in any of the three models except for the half yearly return in model
1a. The insignificant coefficient of scaled volume indicates the lack of a strong
relationship between total volume and scaled stock borrowing, but we note that our raw
data suggest that the unscaled dollar borrowing is proportional to the stock’s trading
volume. Stock borrowing is lower for dividend payers and for volatile stocks. The
coefficient of borrowing cost is not significant. The positive and significant coefficient
of days to cover indicates that borrowers are not deterred by the length of time that it
might take to cover the aggregate borrowed positions. Instead, our findings suggest that
1

We obtain these coefficients using the reg stb function of SAS. These coefficients are
estimates when all variables in the model are standardized to zero mean and unit variance prior to
performing the regression computations. Thus, the standardized intercept is 0.0000. The tstatistics for the standardized and unstandardized coefficients are the same.
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traders may apply momentum strategies and borrow previously borrowed stocks even
more. Sector dummies for utilities, transportation, insurance, financial firms, and the
suppressed base case of industrials are included to capture industry fixed effects.

4.3. Impact of new restrictions on short selling in the home country and on ADRs
In this section we test the regulatory reach hypothesis. We begin with univariate
comparisons of differences in short-selling related borrowing in underlying markets and
ADR markets during the most and least restrictive regimes, in turn.
Table 3 presents a pair-wise comparison of the least restrictive and the most
restrictive short selling regimes for the 18 countries that changed their regulations during
our sample period.2 The different regulatory regimes in the order of increasing
restrictiveness are no ban, uptick rule or naked ban, uptick and naked ban, and total ban
on any type of short selling. Although regulatory effectiveness is not the main focus of
our paper, our panel-data analysis of this issue is more comprehensive than previous
work as prior studies either focused on a single country over time or a cross section of
data across multiple countries.
We observe that short-selling-related stock borrowing scaled by market
capitalization is much higher in less restrictive regimes than in more restrictive regimes.
This statement applies not only to the borrowing in underlying markets, but also extends
to ADRs, consistent with our regulatory reach hypothesis. There is no evidence that
traders try to move their activity internationally to avoid domestic restrictions. For
2

Short selling restrictions changed for China and Malaysia during our sample period;
however, since we do not have stock borrowing data during different regulatory regimes for a
pair-wise comparison for these countries we are unable to include these two countries in our pairwise comparisons.
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example, when Australia restricted short selling, the ratio of shares borrowed to market
capitalization dropped from 2.97% to 1.55%, representing a 48% decline. More
importantly, the scaled short borrowing in Australian ADRs also declined from 0.070%
to 0.035%, representing a 50% decline. The averages for the 18 countries in this table
support the regulatory reach hypothesis as well. When short selling is restricted, the short
borrowing ratio declines by an average of 45% in the home markets and 68% in the ADR
market. Both changes are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In Panel A, we have
used underlying stock’s market capitalization to scale the stock borrowing of both the
ADRs and the underlying stock. Using this metric, the effects of regulations are larger in
magnitude for home markets than for ADRs. Alternatively, because ADR volume is
smaller than the volume in home markets, we also test the differences in stock borrowing
scaled by ADR daily volume in Panel B.3 Average stock borrowing drops from 6.64
times of daily volume in least restrictive regimes to 3.86 times of daily volume in the
most restrictive regimes, which represents a 42% decline.
We also decompose the percentage decline in the stock borrowing in underlying
and ADR markets into the 5 types of regulatory changes adopted by the countries listed
in table 3. For the first type of regulatory change, where countries shift from no ban to a
ban on naked shorts (Free-N), stock borrowing declines by 49% in the underlying market
and 80% in the ADR market. For the second type of restriction, where countries shift
from a ban on naked shorts to a complete or total ban on any type of short selling (N-TB),
stock borrowing declines by 48% in the underlying market and 50% in the ADR market.
3

Datastream, CRSP, shortsqueeze.com, JP Morgan, and BNY Mellon do not report the
ADR float. Since ADR volume is highly correlated with ADR float however, we are able to
proxy float data using volume data for ADRs and underlying stocks that are readily available
from several data sources such as Datastream.
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Table 3
Impact of home market short selling restrictions on stock borrowing in home country and ADR borrowing in the United States
Our sample for this table comprises 1,695 underlying stocks and 853 ADRs from 18 countries that changed their short selling
rules during July 2006 to January 2010. The acronym for restrictions (from the least restrictive to the most restrictive) in the
nature of change column are as follows: no ban (Free), naked ban (N), uptick restriction (UR), naked ban plus uptick (N&UR),
and total ban on any type of short selling (TB). We average the stock borrowings for all firms in a given country for each day d
from Data Explorer during the less (more) restrictions in column 1 (2) for underlying shares and column 5 (6) for ADRs. In
column 4 (8), we present the values in column 3 (7) converted to percentages differences. For Panel A, we scale borrowing of
both ADRs and underlying stock by market capitalization of the underlying stock. For Panel B we scale borrowing of
underlying stock by daily trading volume of the underlying stock and borrowing of ADR by daily trading volume of ADR.
Volume based scaled borrowing is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In the last row of each Panel, we report the tstatistic for a paired difference test.
Panel A: Scaled borrowing = $ shares borrowed / Market capitalization
Underlying in home country
ADRs Anywhere
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
Country
Nature
Less
More
Difference Percentage
Less
More
Difference Percentage
of
RestricRestricCol 2-1
Difference RestricRestricCol 6-5
Difference
change
tions
tions
tions
tions
Australia
N-TB
2.979%
1.551%
-1.427%
-48%
0.070%
0.035%
-0.035%
-50%
Austria
Free-N 3.131%
1.521%
-1.610%
-51%
0.004%
0.001%
-0.003%
-70%
Belgium
Free-N 1.926%
0.716%
-1.210%
-63%
0.030%
0.000%
-0.030%
-100%
Denmark
Free2.607%
0.331%
-2.277%
-87%
0.057%
0.002%
-0.056%
-97%
TB
France
Free-N 5.152%
4.494%
-0.658%
-13%
0.093%
0.005%
-0.088%
-95%
Germany
Free-N 4.981%
2.794%
-2.187%
-44%
0.070%
0.002%
-0.068%
-97%
Greece
N&UR 0.103%
0.072%
-0.031%
-30%
0.038%
0.007%
-0.031%
-80%
- TB
Indonesia
Free0.043%
0.005%
-0.038%
-89%
0.252%
0.193%
-0.059%
-24%
TB
Ireland
Free-N 0.665%
0.079%
-0.586%
-88%
1.139%
0.018%
-1.120%
-98%
Italy
Free-N 3.300%
1.389%
-1.910%
-58%
0.031%
0.033%
0.002%
8%
Japan
UR 1.458%
0.844%
-0.614%
-42%
0.020%
0.009%
-0.012%
-57%
N&UR
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Table 3–continued

Country

Nature
of
change
Netherlands Free-N
Norway
Free-N
Portugal
Free-N
South
N&UR
Korea
- TB
Switzerland Free-N
Taiwan
N&UR
- TB
United
FreeKingdom
TB
Weighted
Average
t values

[1]
Less
Restrictions
3.839%
3.361%
1.368%
0.510%

Underlying in home country
[2]
[3]
[4]
More
Difference Percentage
RestricCol 2-1
Difference
tions
2.560%
-1.279%
-33%
1.648%
-1.713%
-51%
0.522%
-0.846%
-62%
0.203%
-0.307%
-60%

[5]
Less
Restrictions
0.277%
0.028%
0.028%
0.386%

ADRs Anywhere
[6]
[7]
[8]
More
Difference Percentage
RestricCol 6-5
Difference
tions
0.070%
-0.208%
-75%
0.000%
-0.028%
-100%
0.000%
-0.028%
-100%
0.252%
-0.134%
-35%

3.578%
0.073%

2.535%
0.022%

-1.044%
-0.052%

-29%
-70%

0.108%
0.362%

0.029%
0.257%

-0.079%
-0.105%

-73%
-29%

2.604%

1.694%

-0.910%

-35%

0.129%

0.080%

-0.049%

-38%

2.315%

1.277%

-1.039%***

-45%***

0.173%

0.055%

-0.118%**

-68%***

(-6.15)
(-10.43)
(-1.97)
(-8.70)
Panel B. Scaled borrowing = Dollar value of shares borrowed / Firm’s daily trading volume
42.65
15.01
-27.64
-65%***
6.64
3.85
-2.79***
-42%***

Weighted
Average
t values
(-1.09)
***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level

(-3.19)

(-3.40)

(-3.24)

For the third type of restriction, where countries shift from no ban to a complete ban (Free-TB), stock borrowing
declines by 70% in the underlying market and 53% in the ADR market. For the fourth type of restriction, where countries shift
from naked & uptick restriction to a complete ban (N&UR-TB), stock borrowing declines by 53% in the underlying market
and 48% in the ADR market.
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Finally, when countries shift from uptick restriction to a naked & uptick
restriction (UR-N&UR), stock borrowing declines by 42% in the underlying market and
57% in the ADR market. Each of the five types of increases in the regulatory restrictions
reduces short selling in both the underlying market and the ADR market simultaneously,
consistent with the regulatory reach hypothesis.

4.4. Multivariate analysis of regulatory reach
In this section, we test the regulatory reach hypothesis in a multivariate setting by
adding several firm-specific fundamentals or country characteristics. Both short interest
and short volume data are analyzed. First, we estimate regressions based on all or a
subset of the following equation using fortnightly short interest data from
shortsqueeze.com:

scaled ADR short interesti,ft = α0 + α1 illegalc,ft + α2 uptick restrictionc,ft
+ α3 option marketsc,yr + α4 enforcement indexc
+ α5 restrictionsc,ft * enforcement indexc + α6 fortnightly returni,ft-1
+ α7 monthly returni,ft + α8 half-yearly returni,ft
+ α9 orthogonalized market capitalizationi + α10 scaled volumei,ft
+ α11 dividend yieldi,ft + α12 level of ADRi + α13 return volatilityi,ft
+ α14 days to coveri,ft + α15-18 industrial sector fixed effectsi + εi,ft

(2)

where α0–α18 are parameters to be estimated and ε is a random error term. Subscripts i, ft,
c, and yr denote firm, fortnight, country, and year, respectively. See the Appendix for
variable definitions and data sources. To ensure our regression results are robust to sector
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classification effects, we include sector dummies in all models, which are generated using
information sourced from Datastream.
In Table 4, we present our regression results with scaled ADR short interest as the
dependent variable. The coefficient for illegal is negative and significant in all
specifications. 4 Thus, if it is illegal to short sell a stock in its home country, short selling
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also is reduced for that country’s ADRs in the United States., which is evidence in favor
of the regulatory reach hypothesis.
Enforcement index is included as a control variable because stricter enforcement
with less corruption incentivizes traders to follow and implement short-selling rules more
rigorously. We also use an interaction term between enforcement and short-selling
restrictions because enforcement by itself is not very important if there are no restrictions
in the home market. We expect the interaction term to be negative, but it is statistically
insignificant.
The coefficients for the return variables are not significant in any of the three
models. The negative and significant coefficient of orthogonalized market capitalization
indicates that scaled short interest is lower for bigger firms, but we note that our raw data
suggest that the unscaled short interest is higher for larger firms. The positive and
significant coefficient for scaled volume indicates that scaled short interest is higher for
firms with higher trading volume. The negative and significant coefficient for dividend
yield indicates that short sellers do not maintain high open interest in high dividend
paying firms.

1
2
3

4

The coefficient of illegal also is statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better if we
use ordinary least squares standard errors, White’s heteroskedasticity consistent errors, or errors
clustered by firm and fortnight, by firm, by country and time, or by country.
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Table 4
Regulatory reach of home country short selling restrictions on ADR short interest
For this table our sample comprises 1,035 ADRs present in the triangular intersection
of the shortsqueeze.com dataset, Datastream, and the initial ADR list for the period
November 2007 to October 2009. All of our variables are defined in the Appendix. Our
dependent variable, Scaled ADR short interest, is the total short interest for firm i for
fortnight ft, where number of shares outstanding for firm i is used for scaling. Our main
independent variables are the dummy variables illegal and uptick restriction. The
remaining independent variables are: option markets, enforcement index, restriction
*enforcement index, fortnightly return, monthly return, half yearly return, orthogonalized
market capitalization, scaled volume, dividend yield, level of ADR, return volatility, days
to cover(t-1), and sector fixed effects. Subscripts i, ft, c, and yr denote firm, fortnight,
country, and year, respectively. All coefficients are standardized using the SAS proc reg
stb option. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Statistical
significance is based on double clustered standard errors along the firm and fortnightly
time dimensions following Petersen (2009).
Dependent variable: Scaled ADR short interest i,ft
Variable
Model 2a
Model 2b
Model 2c
Intercept
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Illegalc,ft
-0.0158**
-0.0141**
(-2.41)
(-2.05)
-0.0198
-0.0172
Uptick restrictionc,ft
(-1.42)
(-1.20)
Option marketsc,yr
0.0352*
0.0288
0.0281
(1.66)
(1.44)
(1.41)
0.0029
0.0036
0.0018
Enforcement indexc
(0.12)
(0.14)
(0.07)
Restrictionc,ft * Enforcement indexc
-0.0013
0.0087
0.0083
(-0.05)
(0.37)
(0.36)
Fortnightly returni,ft-1
-0.0002
-0.0001
-0.0001
(-0.03)
(-0.01)
(-0.02)
0.0079
0.0074
0.0076
Monthly returni,ft
(0.70)
(0.66)
(0.67)
Half yearly returni,ft
-0.0218
-0.0209
-0.0220
(-1.39)
(-1.33)
(-1.40)
Orthogonalized market capitalizationi
-0.0338***
-0.0348***
-0.0343***
(-3.28)
(-3.38)
(-3.33)
Scaled volumei,ft
0.5535***
0.5535***
0.5534***
(9.09)
(9.10)
(9.10)
Dividend Yieldi,ft
-0.0402***
-0.0418***
-0.0411***
(-2.96)
(-3.04)
(-2.99)
Level of ADR (1-3)i
0.1047***
0.1048***
0.1050***
(3.98)
(3.99)
(4.00)
Return volatilityi,ft
-0.0246**
-0.0274**
-0.0257**
(-2.31)
(-2.53)
(-2.36)
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Table 4–continued
Variable
Days to coveri,ft-1
Sector fixed effects

Dependent variable: Scaled ADR short interest i,ft
Model 2a
Model 2b
Model 2c
0.1556*
0.1554*
0.1555*
(1.81)
(1.81)
(1.81)
Yes
Yes
Yes

Adjusted R Square
0.3755
0.3754
0.3756
Number of Observations
24,235
24,235
24,235
***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.10 level

There are three levels of ADRs and level III ADRs have the most stringent
requirement for trading in the United States.5 We include the level of ADR as a control
variable to see if short sellers are trading level III ADRs more than level I or II ADRs.
We find the coefficient to be positive and significant, indicating more short selling for
higher level ADRs. The negative and significant coefficient of return volatility indicates
that short sellers do not want to maintain high open interest for volatile stocks. The
positive and significant coefficient of days to cover indicates that traders are not deterred
by the length of time that it might take to cover the aggregate short positions outstanding
in the ADRs. Instead, our findings demonstrate that traders apply momentum strategies
and short previously shorted stocks even more.

5

The J.P. Morgan dataset indicates whether the ADR is level I, II, or III. To qualify for
having a sponsored level I ADR, a company’s shares must be traded on at least one non-U.S.
exchange and the firm must post an annual report in English on its web site, but the company is
not required to meet U.S. accounting standards. To qualify for a level II sponsored ADR, a firm
must register with the SEC and comply with U.S. accounting standards. Firms meeting level II
standards can have their ADRs traded on a U.S. stock exchange. Firms wishing to raise capital in
the United States from investors can do so through a level III ADR program by meeting standards
similar to those for U.S. companies. In addition to ADRs that are freely traded, there are two
types of restricted ADRs: a) SEC Rule 144(a) ADRs are private placements that do not trade on
an established exchange and can be purchased only by a Qualified Institutional Buyer and b)
Regulation S ADRs also can be used to raise capital but are not registered in the United States
and can only be traded outside the United States by non-U.S. persons.
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We continue to test the regulatory reach hypothesis using high frequency short
volume data from FINRA and the BATS exchange. We aggregate the transaction
quantity for each stock for each day to form stock-day observations for short selling
volume. We estimate regressions based on all or a subset of the following equation:

scaled ADR short volumei,d = α0 + α1 illegalc,d + α2 uptick restrictionc,d
+ α3 option marketsc,yr + α4 enforcement indexc
+ α5 restrictionsc,d * enforcement indexc + α6 returni,d + α7 weekly returni,d-1
+ α8 monthly returni,d-1 + α9 half-yearly returni,d-1
+ α10 orthogonalized market capitalizationi + α11 dividend yieldi,d
+ α12 level of ADRi + α13 return volatilityi,d
+ α14-17 industrial sector fixed effectsi + εi,d

(3)

where α0–α17 are parameters to be estimated and ε is a random error term.
We report the estimation results for equation 3 in Table 5 and find that these data
largely serve to confirm the evidence presented in the previous table. For brevity, we
focus the discussion on model 3c, where all variables are included.
The coefficient for illegal is negative and significant, indicating that higher levels
of home country restrictions are associated with a lower level of short volume in the
ADR market. The coefficient for uptick restriction, though negative in sign, is not
statistically significant again, implying that its impact is not as strong as a ban on short
selling. The coefficient of option markets is insignificant. The coefficient on enforcement
index itself is positive and statistically significant, but the key testable implication of
enforcement is in the interaction variable, which again is insignificant.
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Table 5
Regulatory reach of home country short selling restrictions on ADR short volume
For this table our sample comprises 559 ADRs present in the FINRA and BATS
datasets for the period August 2009 to January 2010. All of our variables are defined in
the Appendix. Our dependent variable, scaled ADR short volume, is daily short volume
for each firm i for each day d, where we use firm i‘s total trading volume for scaling. Our
main independent variables are the dummy variables illegal and uptick restriction. The
remaining independent variables, defined formally in the Appendix, are: option markets,
enforcement index, restriction* enforcement index, return, weekly return, monthly return,
half yearly return, orthogonalized market capitalization, dividend yield, level of ADR,
return volatility, and sector fixed effects. Subscripts i, d, c, and yr denote firm, day,
country, and year, respectively. All coefficients are standardized using the SAS proc reg
stb option. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Statistical
significance is based on double clustered standard errors along the firm and fortnightly
time dimensions following Petersen (2009).
Dependent variable: Scaled ADR short volume i,d
Variable
Model 3a
Model 3b
Model 3c
Intercept
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Illegalc,d
-0.0292*
-0.0272**
(-1.74)
(-2.02)
Uptick restrictionc,d
-0.0264
-0.0216
(-0.45)
(-0.37)
-0.0686**
-0.0738
-0.0769
Option marketsc,yr
(-2.30)
(-1.56)
(-1.60)
Enforcement indexc
0.1469**
0.1477**
0.1460**
(2.34)
(2.33)
(2.31)
Restrictionc,d * Enforcement indexc
0.0690
0.0831
0.0809
(1.42)
(1.56)
(1.54)
0.0220**
0.0222**
0.0221**
Returni,d
(2.12)
(2.13)
(2.11)
Weekly returni,d-1
0.0382*
0.0388*
0.0385*
(1.84)
(1.88)
(1.86)
Monthly returni,d-1
-0.0543
-0.0542
-0.0542
(-0.87)
(-0.87)
(-0.87)
Half yearly returni,d-1
0.0196
0.0171
0.0184
(0.32)
(0.27)
(0.29)
Orthogonalized market capitalizationi
-0.0436
-0.0445
-0.0438
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Dividend Yieldi,d
-0.0146
-0.0130
-0.0143
(-0.72)
(-0.65)
(-0.71)
Level of ADR (1-3)i
0.0101
0.0152
0.0125
(0.23)
(0.36)
(0.30)
Return volatilityi,d
0.0955***
0.0967***
0.0958***
(2.89)
(2.91)
(2.89)
Sector fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Table 5–continued
Dependent variable: Scaled ADR short volume i,d
Variable
Model 3a
Model 3b
Model 3c
Adjusted R Square
0.042
0.0416
0.0422
Number of Observations
27,209
27,206
27,206
**Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.10 level

The positive and significant coefficients for shorter term return variables are
consistent with prior studies that characterize short sellers as contrarian traders who short
stock when it experiences a significant price appreciation (Diether, Lee, and Werner,
2009; Jain, Jain, and McInish, 2012). The effect of the monthly and half-yearly returns on
short volume is found to be insignificant. Coefficients for firm size, dividend yield, and
ADR level are insignificant. Stock volatility has a positive coefficient in the volume
regression, whereas it had a negative coefficient in the short interest regression. Thus,
volatility induces short sellers to become active, but they are quick to cover their
positions for such stocks, driving down the short open interest.
Our conclusions about the impact of home country regulations on ADRs using
both fortnightly short interest data and high frequency FINRA short volume data are
qualitatively similar, which is not surprising given the statistically significant positive
correlation of 0.76 between these two alternative dependent variables. To estimate this
measure, we sum the FINRA short volume to calculate fortnightly short volume, and,
then we calculate the correlation between the two fortnightly variables. Overall, our
results support the regulatory reach hypothesis.

4.5. Reverse regulatory reach
So far, we have analyzed the reach of home market restrictions on short selling of
ADRs in the United States. However, the United States itself temporarily banned short
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selling of financial stocks on Sept. 19, 2008. In this section, we test if there is regulatory
reach in the reverse direction, i.e., we investigate the effects of short selling restrictions in
the United States on stock borrowing for U.S. financial firms outside U.S. markets.
In Table 6, we present the results of an event study around the U.S. short ban
period where we analyze the stock borrowing for U.S. stocks in domestic and foreign
locations. We compute the changes in these variables from the period one month before
to the period one month after Sept. 19, 2008. We find that the ban reduced scaled stock
borrowing for the affected firms by 20% within the United States. There is no evidence of
any regulatory arbitrage where traders moved their activity to foreign jurisdictions.
Instead the evidence points to reverse regulatory reach of U.S. regulations in foreign
locations; stock borrowing for U.S. firms reduced by 70% in foreign locations. Reverse
regulatory reach applies to U.S. banks as well as to non-banking financial firms.
Additional insights into the issue of reverse regulatory reach for U.S. financial
stocks borrowed in foreign locations may be obtained by estimating the following
multivariate regression:

scaled shares borrowed in foreign locationsi,d = α0 + α1 illegald
+ α2 option marketsi + α3 returni,d + α4 weekly returni,d-1 + α5 monthly returni,d-1
+ α6 half-yearly returni,d-1 + α7 scaled volumei,d + α8 dividend yieldi,d
+ α9 return volatilityi,d + α10 stock borrowing costi,d + εi,d
where α0–α10 are parameters to be estimated and ε is a random error term.
Subscripts i and d denote firm and day, respectively.
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(4)

Table 6
Impact of SEC’s temporary short selling ban on stock borrowing within the United States and outside the United States
We analyze the period one month before and one month after Sept. 19, 2008, when the SEC imposed a temporary short
selling ban for 799 financial firms. Of these, 539 firms have stock borrowing information in Data Explorers. We analyze scaled
borrowing, which is outstanding stock borrowing for each firm i on day d, scaled using each firm’s market capitalization.
Scaled borrowing for the firms in the United States before the ban period (during the ban period) is reported in column 1 (2).
Scaled borrowing for the firms outside the United States before the ban period (during the ban period) is reported in column 5
(6). In column 3 (7), we present column 2 minus 1 (6 minus 5). In column 4 (8), we present the values in column 3 (7)
converted to percentages.
Scaled borrowing = $ Shares borrowed / Market Capitalization
Domestic stocks outside U.S./Underlying in
In U.S. - Domestic stocks or ADRs
Home country
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
Before
Ban
Col 3-2
Percentage
Before
Ban
Col 3-2 Percentage
Ban
Difference
Ban
Difference
Overall
3.248%
2.590% -0.657%***
-20%
0.051%
0.015% -0.036%*
-70%
t-stat
(13.77)
(1.68)
Commercial Banks
Saving Institutions
and other Banks
Banks

3.890%
1.855%

3.210%
1.446%

-0.680%
-0.410%

-17%
-22%

0.122%
0.000%

0.027%
0.001%

-0.095%
0.001%

-78%
0%

2.956%

2.400%

-0.556%

-19%

0.085%

0.019%

-0.066%

-78%

Insurance Carriers
Other Non Banks
Non - Banks

2.984%
4.828%
4.011%

2.227%
3.773%
3.088%

-0.757%
-1.055%
-0.923%

-25%
-22%
-23%

0.052%
0.013%
0.030%

0.016%
0.011%
0.013%

-0.036%
-0.002%
-0.017%

-69%
-17%
-57%

ADRs
0.065%
0.040%
-0.025%
***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level

-38%

2.004%

1.282%

-0.723%

-36%
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In this regression, the illegal dummy has a value of 1 during the period of the
temporary ban on short selling in the United States from Sept. 19, 2008 to Oct. 8, 2008,
and 0 otherwise. The option market dummy has a value of 1 if the stock is optionable and
0 otherwise. All variable definitions and data sources are shown in the Appendix. The
results are presented in Table 7 and reveal that the coefficient for illegal is negative and
significant. This suggest that where short selling is temporarily banned in the United
States for a given firm, stock borrowing for that firm also is reduced in foreign locations.
Thus, these results indicate that U.S. regulations also have regulatory reach, which we
call reverse regulatory reach to aid clarity. The coefficient of option markets is positive
and significant, implying a complementary relationship between shorting and derivatives.
The coefficients for the return variables are not statistically significant as are the
coefficients for scaled volume, return volatility and stock borrowing cost variables. The
negative and significant coefficient for dividend yield indicates that stock borrowing is
lower for dividend payers.
Overall, our results reject the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis and support the
regulatory reach hypothesis, including reverse regulatory reach. To provide further
insights into these relationships, we now proceed to consider the mechanisms of
regulatory reach.

4.6. Mechanisms of regulatory reach
We have grouped the possible mechanisms of regulatory reach into two main
categories–inter-government cooperation and investor conduct. On the one hand,
discussion groups such as the G7, EU, and OECD as well as bilateral investment treaties
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Table 7
Reverse regulatory reach of U.S. short selling restriction outside the United States
For this table our sample comprises 168 domestic U.S. firms that have borrowings
outside the United States during July 2006 to January 2010. All of our variables are
defined in the Appendix. The dependent variable, scaled shares borrowed in foreign
locations, is outstanding stock borrowing for each firm i for each day d, from Data
Explorer, scaled by each firm’s market capitalization in the home market. Our main
independent variable is the dummy variable illegal. The remaining independent variables
are: option, return, weekly return, monthly return, half yearly return, scaled volume,
dividend yield, return volatility, and borrowing cost. Subscripts i, d, c, and yr denote firm,
day, country, and year, respectively. All coefficients are standardized using the SAS proc
reg stb option. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Statistical significance is based on double clustered standard errors along the firm and
fortnightly time dimensions following Petersen (2009).
Variable
Intercept
Illegal

Dependent variable: Scaled shares borrowed in foreign locations i,d
0.0000
-0.0093**
(-2.36)
0.1623*
Optioni
(1.87)
Returni,d
-0.0003
(-0.10)
-0.0007
Weekly returni,d-1
(-0.08)
Monthly returni,d-1
0.0068
(0.47)
Half yearly returni,d-1
0.0056
(0.12)
0.0257
Scaled volumei,d
(1.04)
Dividend Yieldi,d
-0.1178*
(-1.65)
Return volatilityi,d
-0.0024
(-1.59)
Borrowing costi,d
0.0004
(0.03)
Adjusted R Square
0.0466
Number of Observations
13,229
***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.10 level
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between countries, facilitate the implementation of regulatory intent through cross border
recognition of laws by enforcement agencies and courts. On the other hand, investors’
own behavior is influenced by an adherence to ethical practices such as those mentioned
in the CFA standards of ethical and professional conduct, or conservative business
practices driven by a desire to build an honest reputation. In the analysis that follows, we
discriminate between these two different reasons. We proxy the mechanism of intergovernment cooperation by using information on the originating country’s membership in
G7, EU, or OECD groups and more formal bilateral investment treaties (BTTs) between
countries. For the investor conduct mechanism, we have two proxies, concentration of
CFA charter holders in the finance industry and the institutional infrastructure for stock
borrowing. Neither of these two variables emanates directly from the short selling
statutes, but both relate to the inherent desire of traders to do things in the right manner.
We expect that CFA charter holders follow the professional conduct of knowing laws in
different jurisdictions and adhering to the stricter law regarding short selling restrictions.
Likewise, if institutions follow the spirit of the restrictions on short trades, they reduce
their stock lending operations even though the law may not prohibit lending itself.
This analysis is based only on the observations where short selling is illegal in the
home country (illegal =1) because we are interested in assessing the reach of regulatory
restrictions, not the reach of regulatory freedom. Consequently, the illegal variable is not
included in the regression model. The dependent variable is the scaled ADR short interest
and the independent variables capture information on the possible mechanisms of
regulatory reach as well as a number of control variables similar to those used previously:
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scaled ADR short interesti,ft = α0 + α1 G7c + α2 EUc + α3 OECDc
+ α4 Group (G7/EU/OECD)c + α5 Bi-lateral investment treaty with U.S.c
+ α6 CFA/Populationc + α7 option marketsc,yr + α8 enforcement indexc
+ α9 fortnightly returni,ft-1 + α10 monthly returni,ft + α11 half-yearly returni,ft
+ α12 orthogonalized market capitalizationi + α13 scaled volumei,ft
+ α14 dividend yieldi,ft + α15 level of ADRi + α16 return volatilityi,ft
+ α17 days to coveri,ft + α18-21 industrial sector fixed effectsi + εi,ft

(5)

where α0–α21 are parameters to be estimated and ε is a random error term. Subscripts i, ft,
c, and yr denote firm, fortnight, country, and year, respectively. See the Appendix for
variable definitions and data sources. We present our analysis of these mechanisms in
Table 8, which presents the regression results. The first six models are regression
equations that individually test our different measures of the mechanisms of regulatory
reach. We find that the coefficients for the measures of inter-government cooperation are
all negative and generally significant (only the coefficient for the bilateral investment
treaty with the United States is insignificant in these stand-alone regressions). Further the
CFA/Population investor conduct variable is statistically significant and negative (0.2074 in model 6). Taken together, these results suggest that both inter-government
cooperation and investor conduct are effective mechanisms of regulatory reach. The final
model (7) presented in Table 8 includes the group (G7/EU/OECD), bilateral investment
treaty, and the CFA/Population variables. The coefficient for bilateral investment treaty is
negative but statistically significant. The group variable again has a negative sign, but is
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no longer significant. 6 Finally, the CFA/Population investor conduct has a statistically
12345

significant negative coefficient in both combined regression and stand-alone regression.
The proportion of CFA charter holders is a good proxy for investor conduct not
only because of their strong emphasis on high standards of ethics and professional
conduct, but also because obtaining a CFA charter is a personal educational decision
largely independent of the inter-government cooperation among countries. Nonetheless,
we also orthogonalize this investor conduct proxy to make it statistically independent of
the inter-government cooperation in a two-step regression. For the sake of brevity, we
choose not to report these results, however, we do note that the coefficient for the
orthogonalized CFA variable is significantly negative, indicating that investor conduct is
a driving force behind the regulatory reach of foreign laws. Legal restrictions in the home
market limit the shares institutions make available for borrowing, aiding regulatory reach.
We test and confirm this in the data where a regression of scaled shares available to
borrow on the illegal variable produces a negative coefficient for illegal variable.7 Thus,
when a country bans short selling, fewer shares of that country’s stocks are available
worldwide for short sellers to borrow, which again results in short sellers being less
aggressive.
1
2
3
4

6

We also use executive membership of International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) as an additional proxy for inter-government cooperation. We find the
coefficient of the IOSCO dummy variable to be insignificant both with and without any control
variables.
7
The results are not tabulated for brevity but are summarized in the following equation.
Scaled shares available to borrow worldwidei,d = 0.0000 (Intercept) - 0.0811 Illegalc,d + 0.6790
Uptick restrictionc,d + 0.0259 Option marketsc,yr - 0.0012 Returni,d + 0.0156 Weekly returni,d Monthly returni,d + 0.0194 Half yearly returni,d + 0.0858 Scaled volumei,d - 0.0476 Dividend
Yieldi,d - 0.0339 Return volatilityi,d -0.0422 Borrowing costi,d - 0.0035 Days to coveri,d-1+ Sector
fixed effects + εi,d where bold indicates significance at the 0.10 level or better using double
cluster standard errors. Shares available to borrow worldwide is the value of current inventory
available from beneficial owners for loans scaled by market capitalization of the firm.
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Table 8
Mechanism of regulatory reach of home country short selling restrictions on ADR short interest
For this table our sample comprises 196 ADRs for which illegal equals one, which is a subset of the 1,035 ADRs present in
the triangular intersection of the shortsqueeze.com dataset, Datastream, and the initial ADR list from November 2007 to
October 2009. Our dependent variable, scaled ADR short interest, is total short interest for firm i for fortnight ft, scaled by
each firm’s shares outstanding. Our main independent variables are G7, EU, OECD, Group (G7/EU/OECD), Bilateral
investment treaty with United States, and CFA/ Population. The remaining independent variables are: option markets,
enforcement index, fortnightly, monthly, and half yearly returns, orthogonalized market capitalization, scaled volume,
dividend yield, level of ADR, return volatility, days to cover(t-1),and sector fixed effects. Subscripts i, ft, c, and yr denote firm,
fortnight, country, and year, respectively. All coefficients are standardized using the SAS proc reg stb option. Continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Statistical significance is based on double clustered standard errors
along the firm and fortnightly time dimensions following Petersen (2009).

Variable
Intercept
G7c

[1]
0.0000
-0.0518**
(-2.41)

EUc
OECDc

[2]
0.0000

Dependent variable: Scaled ADR short interest i,ft
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

[7]
0.0000

-0.0865**
(-2.58)
-0.1352*
(-1.81)

Group (G7/EU/OECD)c

-0.1372*
(-1.83)

Bilateral investment treaty with U.S.c

-0.0672
(-1.38)
-0.2074***
(-2.80)

CFA/Populationc
Option marketsc,yr
Enforcement indexc
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-0.1226
(-1.37)
-0.1068**
(-1.97)
-0.0807*
(-1.93)
0.1334
(1.16)
-0.0451
(-0.47)

Table 8–continued
Variable
Fortnightly Returni,ft-1

[1]

Dependent variable: Scaled ADR short interest i,ft
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
0.0070
(0.52)
-0.0028
(-0.15)
-0.0015
(-0.07)
-0.0096
(-0.22)
0.7712***
(4.05)
0.0033
(0.14)
0.0054
(0.10)
-0.0356*
(-1.71)
0.0936***
(2.66)
Yes

[2]

Monthly returni,ft
Half yearly returni,ft
Orthogonalized market capitalizationi
Scaled volumei,ft
Dividend Yieldi,ft
Level of ADR (1-3)i
Return volatilityi,ft
Days to coveri,ft-1
Sector fixed effects

Adjusted R Square
0.0023
0.0071
0.0179
0.0184
Number of Observations
2,389
2,389
2,389
2,389
***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.10 level
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0.0041
2,389

0.0426
2,389

0.6844
1,197

4.7. Robustness tests
We find that the negative coefficient on illegal in the regulatory reach regression
of scaled ADR short interest is robust to alternative model specifications and subsamples. For the sake of brevity, we do not formally tabulate these results, but instead
choose to summarize our findings in this section. In this discussion of robustness tests,
the benchmark value for the coefficient of illegal is -0.0158 from model 2a of Table 4.
First, we estimate the regression with unscaled dollar short borrowing without
adjusting for the number of shares outstanding. The coefficient of illegal is -0.0370,
which suggests a slightly stronger regulatory reach on dollar borrowing than on
borrowing ratio. Second, we estimate the scaled borrowing regression using a smaller
sample of only level III ADRs, which are subject to the most stringent U.S. securities
regulations and trade alongside other U.S. stocks on the main stock exchanges. The
coefficient of illegal is -0.0073, implying that even level III ADRs are affected by home
country short selling regulations. Third, we control for institutional ownership, which has
a positive relation with short selling, consistent with prior research. Due to limited data
availability, when we add institutional ownership as the only control variable in the
regression, the sample size still drops dramatically from 24,235 in Table 4 to 9,758. This
does not change the tenor of our results however, as the coefficient of illegal remains
negative (-0.0427) and statistically significant. The coefficient for institutional ownership
itself is 0.2352 and statistically significant; the positive coefficient is consistent with
D’Avolio (2002) and Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) who argue that higher
institutional ownership positively affects short selling by increasing the supply of
loanable shares. Our fourth robustness test is based on an alternative definition of days to
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cover (DTC). In our main analysis presented in Table 4, we use DTC in the ADR market.
DTCh for the home market cannot be computed directly from home country borrowing
data. Furthermore, DTCh cannot be computed if a country banned short selling related
stock borrowing in the home markets. Keeping in mind those limitations, we compute a
surrogate home market DTCh defined as stock borrowed divided by daily home country
trading volume. With short interest as the dependent variable, the coefficient on home
country DTCh is insignificant in double clustered regressions. However, the coefficient of
illegal remains statistically significant with a negative value of -0.0181. The coefficient
for illegal remains statistically significant and negative also if we drop DTC from the
regressions.
Next, we test the regulatory reach hypothesis for the three sub-periods before,
during, and after the 2008 financial crisis. We estimate these four models with unscaled
short interest as the dependent variables. The estimated coefficients for the illegal
variable are negative and statistically significant in all three regressions ranging from 0.0677 to -0.0272, compared with the overall period coefficient of -0.0370. Similarly,
home country short selling restrictions have a negative impact on scaled short interest,
both including and excluding the crisis period. The results indicate that restrictions curtail
short selling in the ADR markets and that the financial crisis did not materially change
the phenomenon of regulatory reach.
Finally, we perform a control sample analysis to ensure that negative coefficient
on illegal is based on regulatory reach of home country restrictions and not on any
confounding factors within the United States that would affect all domestic stocks as well
as the ADRs. We match each ADR with a non-ADR domestic U.S. stock. Our matching
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criteria include industry, exchange listing, price-to-book value (PTBV), and market
capitalization. 8 Short selling of U.S. stocks is not expected to be affected by changes in
1234567

the legality of short selling abroad for the matched stocks. We exclude the period when
short selling is restricted in the United States. ADR stocks are similar to the matched
control sample of U.S. stocks except that some ADRs originate from a home country with
short selling restrictions whereas others originate from unsrestricted countries. Using this
control sample, we estimate a regression with scaled short interest as the dependent
variable.9 The illegal variable in this model is interacted with the indicator variables for
ADRs (treatment stocks) or domestic stocks (matched control sample). We find that the
home country regulations reach out in lowering the ADR short interest (with a negative
coefficient of -0.0516 that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level); however, those
regulations appear to have no impact on short interest of matched non-ADR domestic
U.S. stocks (the coefficient 0.0250 is not significant even at the 0.10 level).
Thus, the additional analysis discussed in this sub-section indicates that our
results on regulatory reach are robust for different specifications and sub-samples.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8

For the Price to Book Value for ADRs (Non-ADR domestic U.S. firms) the means are
3.13 (3.13) and the standard deviations are 6.81 (5.91). For the Ln Market value for ADRs (NonADR domestic U.S. firms) the means are 7.80 (7.35) and the standard deviations are 1.99 (1.79).
9

The results are not tabulated for brevity but the regressions estimates can be
summarized as follows: Scaled short interesti,ft = 0.0000 Intercept - 0.0347 Illegalc,ft*ADR +
0.0190 Illegalc,ft*Non ADR domestic U.S. stocks - 0.0153 Uptick restrictionsc,ft - 0.0558 Option
marketsc,yr + 0.0577 Enforcement indexc + 0.0188 Restrictionc,d * Enforcement indexc + 0.0002
Fortnightly returni,ft−1 - 0.0052 Monthly returni,ft - 0.0236 Half yearly returni,ft + 0.0043
Orthogonalized market capitalizationi,ft + 0.3808 Scaled volumei,ft - 0.0307 Dividend yieldi,ft
- 0.0298 Return volatilityi,ft + 0.2931 Days to coverft−1 + Industry fixed effects + εi,ft where bold
indicates significance at the 0.10 level or better.
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Chapter 5
Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive characterization of the
worldwide market for short selling and stock borrowing using several datasets that
capture short selling regulations, actual short selling, and outstanding short interest in
stocks from 82 countries. The theme of our paper is the examination of global regulatory
reach of short selling restrictions in a multimarket environment.
The first issue that we address is whether restrictions on short selling in a given
country are effective in reducing short-selling-related borrowing. Our results suggest that
short selling regulations reduce borrowing in the home country by 45%, on average.
Next, we examine whether home country restrictions on short selling reduce short
selling of ADRs in the United States, which we call the “regulatory reach” hypothesis.
Alternatively, the competing hypothesis of regulatory arbitrage takes the view that if
short selling is illegal in a home country, there is greater short selling in the United States
of the ADRs from that country due to short sellers’ efforts to circumvent the home
country regulations. Using data from shortsqueeze.com, FINRA, BATS, and Data
Explorers, we find support for the regulatory reach hypothesis in cross-sectional, event
study, and panel-data tests. Due to the regulatory reach of home country short selling
restrictions, stock borrowing for the affected ADRs drops by 68%, on average, in the
United States. Similarly, in a multivariate regression of scaled short interest, the
statistically significant negative coefficient again supports our regulatory reach
hypothesis. Our results are robust to differences in firm specific characteristics, such as
option market availability, past returns, firm size, trading volume, dividend yield, return
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volatility, days to cover, level of ADR, and industrial sectors. We also document a
reverse regulatory reach for the SEC’s temporary short selling ban on shorting 799
financial stocks in 2008, which reduced stock borrowing for these firms both within and
outside the United States.
Various mechanisms can cause home market regulations to have a strong global
regulatory reach and we consider two possible mechanisms–inter-government
cooperation and investor conduct. Inter-government cooperation can work through
working groups such as G7, OECD or EU or bilateral investment treaties. Investor
conduct is influenced by professional standards of bodies such as CFA institute or
institutional unwillingness to conduct stock lending when short selling is illegal. Our
results indicate that investor and institutional conduct strengthens regulatory reach more
than membership in working groups or treaties.
Our paper contributes to the short selling and cross listing research with two main
findings. First, restrictions on short selling in a given country are effective in reducing
short-selling-related borrowing in that country. Second, from the investors’ point of view,
cross listing in the United States is not a vehicle for circumventing regulatory control on
short selling in the home country. Regulatory controls in the home country also stifle
short selling of ADRs. An important implication of our regulatory reach findings is that
the regulators appear to have a great ability to obtain desired investor protection
outcomes with little sacrifice on business competitiveness front even in a fiercely
competitive global economy. Additional cooperation and coordination among the global
enforcement agencies can further strengthen regulatory reach.
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Appendix
Variables definitions and data sources
Variable
Definition
Measures of short selling (dependent variables)
Shares borrowed
Total value of borrowed/loaned securities net of
double counting, reported at daily frequency

Source
Data Explorers

Total short interest

Total number of outstanding shorted shares for
each ADR reported at fortnightly frequency

Shortsqueeze.com

Short volume

Aggregate number of shares sold short each day
(computed from transaction level data)

Reg SHO data from FINRA and
BATS exchange

Indicator variable that has value of 1 when short
selling is banned in the home country and 0 when
short selling is allowed

Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu
(2007), Charoenrook and
Daouk (2008), Clifford Chance
LLP. (2009), and for time series
Beber and Pagano (2012) and
direct correspondence with
stock exchanges and regulators

Uptick restriction

Indicator variable that has value of 1 when short
selling is restricted by price tests in the home
country and 0 otherwise

Clifford Chance LLP. (2009)
and stock exchanges websites

Restriction

Indicator variable that has value of 1 when short
selling is restricted by any means such as total
ban, ban on naked short selling, or price tests in
the home country and 0 otherwise

Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu
(2007), Charoenrook and
Daouk (2008), Clifford Chance
LLP. (2009), and for time series
Beber and Pagano (2012) and
direct correspondence with
stock exchanges and regulators

Regulatory measures
Illegal
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Appendix –continued
Variable
Country and market design variables

Definition

Source

Option markets

Number of years for which the option markets
have existed in a particular country

Charoenrook and Daouk (2008)

Option

Indicator variable that has value of 1 when the
options for particular stocks are traded on CBOE,
and 0 otherwise.

CBOE option trading list

Enforcement index (CPI)

Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranks each
country by its perceived level of corruption
relating to bribery of public officials, kickbacks
in public procurement, embezzlement of public
funds, and effectiveness of public sector anticorruption efforts. Higher numbers indicate
stronger enforcement and lower numbers indicate
corruption and lawlessness.

Transparency International

G7

Indicator variable that has value of 1 for G7
countries.

EU

Indicator variable that has value of 1 for
European Union countries.

OECD

Indicator variable that has value of 1 for OECD
countries.

Group (G7/EU/OECD)

Indicator variable that has value of 1 when the
country is part of G7, EU, or OECD group.

Bilateral investment treaty
with U.S.

Indicator variable that has value of 1 when the
country has signed a bilateral investment treaty
with the United States
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http://www.transparency.org/po
licy_research/surveys_indices/c
pi

United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development
(UNCTAD)

Appendix –continued
Variable
CFA/Population

Definition
Number of charterholders in the country divided
by the population of that country

Source
CFA institute member resources
and www.worldatlas.com

Return (Daily or
fortnightly)

Log (Return indext)-log (Return indext-1). For
daily returns we substitute d for t. For fortnightly
returns we substitute ft for t. The Return index is
adjusted for dividends. These are essentially a
firm’s stock returns.

Datastream International

Weekly return

Log (Return indexd-1)-log (Return indexd-6).

Datastream International

Monthly return

Log (Return indexd-1)-log (Return indexd-21).

Datastream International

Half yearly return

Log (Return indexd-1)-log (Return indexd-121).

Datastream International

Orthogonalized market
capitalization

Market capitalization is a firm’s share price
multiplied by the number of ordinary shares
outstanding in millions of USD at the beginning
of our sample period. For table 4, we
orthogonalized market capitalization by
regressing it on shares outstanding and trading
volume. For table 5, we orthogonalized market
capitalization by regressing it on trading volume.

Datastream International

Scaled volume

For daily level borrowing data regressions, it is
dollar value of trading volume on day t divided
by market capitalization. For fortnightly short
interest regressions, it is trading volume in terms
of number of shares on the last day of fortnight
divided by shares outstanding.

Datastream International

Firm-specific variables
Return variables
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Appendix –continued
Variable
Dividend yield

Definition
Dividend per share as a percentage of the firm’s
share price

Source
Datastream International

Level of ADR

Ordinal variable that equals 1(OTC), 2 (exchange
listed), or 3 (public offering to raise capital)

Bank of New York Mellon
(www.adrbnymellon.com) and
JP Morgan (www.adr.com)

Return volatility

For daily regressions, it is intraday high price
minus intraday low price divided by intraday high
price. For fortnightly regressions it is fortnightly
high price minus fortnightly low price divided by
fortnightly high price.

Datastream International

Borrowing costs

Stock borrowing cost is value weighted average
stock lending fee for all open loans expressed in
undisclosed fee buckets 0-5 (0 indicates the
cheapest to borrow). Stock borrower indirectly
pays the lending fee to the stock lender. Basically
the lending fee is an imputed cost; it is the
amount of rebate in the interest paid by the
security lender to the security borrower on cash
collateral which borrower provides to the lender.

Data Explorers

Lagged days to cover
(DTC)

Current short interest divided by average daily
trading volume (ratio computed for previous day)

Shortsqueeze.com

Sector fixed effects

Dummy variables for Utility, Transportation,
Financial, and Insurance sectors. Base case is the
“Industrials” sector.

Datastream International

55

References
Asquith, P., Pathak, A., Ritter, J., 2005. Short interest, institutional ownership, and
stock returns, Journal of Financial Economics 78, 243-276.
Avgouleas, E., 2010. A new framework for the global regulation of short sales, Stanford
Journal of Law, Business and Finance section, 16, 1-65.
Battalio, R., Schultz, P., 2011. Regulatory uncertainty and market liquidity: The 2008
short sale ban’s impact on equity option markets, Journal of Finance 66, 20132053.
Beber, A., Pagano, M., 2012. Short selling bans around the world: Evidence from
2007-2009 crisis, Journal of Finance (forthcoming).
Blau, B.M., Van Ness, B.F., Van Ness, R.A., Wood, R.A., 2010. Short selling during
extreme market movements, Journal of Trading 54, 14-27.
Blau, B.M., Van Ness, R.A., Warr, R.S., 2012. Short selling of ADRs and foreign market
short-sale constraints, Journal of Banking and Finance 36, 2012.
Block, L., 2007. International policing in Russia: Police cooperation between the
European Union member states and the Russian Federation, Policing and Society 17.
Boehmer, E., Jones, C.M., Zhang, X., 2009. Shackling the short sellers: The 2008
shorting ban. Working paper, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
Boulton, T.J., Braga-Alves, M.V., 2010. The skinny on the 2008 naked short-sale
restrictions, Journal of Financial Markets 13, 397-421.
Bris, A., 2008. Short selling activity in financial stocks and the SEC July 15th emergency
order. Working Paper, available at www.econ.upf.edu.
Bris, A., Goetzmann,W.N., Zhu, N., 2007. Efficiency and the bear: Short sales and
markets around the world, Journal of Finance 62, 1029-1079.
Charoenrook, A., Daouk, H., 2008. A study of market wide short selling restrictions.
Working paper, Vanderbilt University and Cornell University.
Clifford Chance LLP, 2009. Short selling rules: the global picture. http://ca.
linexlegal.com/transit.php?content_id=94994
Coffee, J.C., 1999. The future as history: The prospects for global convergence in
corporate governance and its implications, Northwestern University Law Review 93,
641-708.

56

Coffee, J.C., 2002. Racing towards the top? The impact of cross-listings and stock market
competition on international corporate governance, Columbia Law Review 102, 17571831.
D’Avolio, G., 2002. The market for borrowing stock, Journal of Financial Economics 66,
271-306.
Diether, K.B., Lee, K.-H., Werner, I.M., 2009. Short sale strategies and return
predictability. Review of Financial Studies 22, 575-607.
Edwards, A.K., Hanley, K.W., 2010. Short selling in initial public offerings, Journal of
Financial Economics 98, 21-39.
Ellickson, R.C., 1991. Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass.)
Erickson, M., Goolsbee, A., Maydew, E., 2003. How Prevalent is Tax Arbitrage?
Evidence from Corporate Investments in Municipal Bonds, National Tax Journal 56,
259-270.
Figlewski, S., Webb, G.P., 1993. Options, short sales, and market completeness, Journal
of Finance 48, 761-777.
Financial Services Authority newsletter, 2002. “Short Selling,” Discussion Paper 17,
October. www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp17_newsletter.pdf.
Foerster, S.R., Karolyi, G.A., 1999. The effects of market segmentation and investor
recognition on asset prices: Evidence from foreign stocks listing in the United States,
Journal of Finance 54, 981-1013.
Hamilton, J., 2008. Market Crisis Focus on Short Selling: SEC Adopts Rules to Curb
Abusive Practices. Woltesr Kluwer Law &Business, White paper, http://www.
cch.com/Press/news/CCHWhitePaper_MarketCrisis.pdf.
Jain, C., Jain, P.K., McInish, T.H., 2012. Short selling: The impact of SEC rule 201 of
2010, Financial Review 47, 37-64.
Jones, C.M., Lamont, O.A., 2002. Short sale constraints and stock returns, Journal of
Financial Economics 66, 207-239.
Keller, D., 2004. Interpreting foreign law through an Erie lens: A critical look at United
States vs. McNab, Texas International Law Journal 40, 157-190.
Kolasinksi, A.C., Reed, A.V., Thornock, J.R., 2009. Prohibitions versus constraints: The
2008 short sales regulations. Working paper, University of Washington at Seattle,
Washington and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

57

Lau, S.T., McInish, T.H., 2002. Cross-listing and home market trading volume: The case
of Malaysia and Singapore, Journal of Financial Research 25, 477-484.
Nilsson, R., 2008. The value of shorting, Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 880-891.
Pagano, M., Panetta, F., Zingales, L., 1998. Why Do Companies Go Public? An
Empirical Analysis. Journal of Finance 53, 27-64.
Paley, A.R., Hilzenrath, D.S., 2008. SEC Chief Defends His Restraint; Cox Rebuffs
Criticism of Leadership During Crisis, Washington Post, December 24. Available at
www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/12/23/AR2008122302765.html.
Petersen, M.A., 2009. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing
approaches, Review of Financial Studies 22, 435-480.
Saffi, P.A.C., Sigurdsson, K., 2011. Price efficiency and short selling, Review of
Financial Studies 24, 821-852.
Schram, S.F., 2000. After Welfare: The Culture of Postindustrial Social Policy (NYU
Press, New York, NY). ISBN 0-8147-9755-5. p. 91
Securities Exchange Commission’s 2008-235 statement “Statement of Securities and
Exchange Commission Concerning Short Selling and Issuer Stock Repurchases,”
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-235.htm.
Shkilko, A.V., Van Ness, B.F., Van Ness, R.A., 2008. Aggressive short selling and price
reversals. Working paper, Wilfrid Laurier University, University of Mississippi,
Presented at AFA 2008.
Williams, R., 2009. US Regulator: Short-selling Ban was Disruptive, The Age, March 4.
Available at www.theage.com.au/business/us-regulator-shortselling-ban-wasdisruptive-20090303-8ne6.html.

58

